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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
FRANK GENE POWELL, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
Case No. 920206 
Category No. 1 
JURISDICTION OP THE SUPREME COURT 
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah State 
Supreme Court pursuant to §78-2(a)-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Is the appellate court precluded from considering the 
issue of whether or not the trial court committed error in 
instructing the jury where trial counsel did object to the giving 
of instructions at the time of trial? 
2. Is the appellate court prohibited from considering whether 
the Appellant should have been sentenced to a lesser offense where 
trial counsel did not raise the issue at the time of trial? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, ETC. 
The dispositive provisions are as set forth in Appellant's 
brief on appeal. 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
This matter comes before the Supreme Court in the manner set 
forth in Appellant's brief on appeal. This brief is offered in 
reply to the brief of the Appellee, 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment against FRANK GENE POWELL 
for Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree. Appellant was 
convicted by a jury after a trial which commenced the 1st day of 
April, 1992, in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah 
County, the Honorable Boyd L. Park, presiding. After the verdict 
of the jury, Appellant was sentenced to a term of five (5) years to 
life in the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts of this case are as set forth in Appellant's brief 
on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellee asserts that the Appellant is barred from raising the 
issues of whether or not the juror was properly instructed by the 
trial court and whether or not the Appellant should have been 
sentenced to a lesser offense where trial counsel did not raise 
those issues at the time of trial. Appellant argues that the 
instructing of the jury in a homicide case concerning the 
definition of terms constituting elements of the offense 
constituted prejudicial error, plain error and manifest error. 
Said failure being fundamental prejudicial to the Appellant. 
Appellant argues that the court has the right to correct an 
2 
improper sentence at any time and that the failure to do so would 
result in a denial of equal protection of the law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT CAN REVIEW THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS CHALLENGED 
IN APPELLANT'S POINT I OF HIS BRIEF ON APPEAL AS 
THE ERROR WAS PLAIN ERROR 
Appellee has declined to brief the issues raised by Point I of 
Appellant's brief on appeal which questioned the instructions to 
the jury given by the court defining the term "depraved 
indifference." Appellee's basis for failing to brief was that the 
issue had not been raised by the Defendant at the time of trial and 
that Appellant had not claimed the failure to properly instruct-
constituted "plain error." 
In Appellantfs argument, while not specifically using the term 
"plain error" to describe the nature and seriousness of the failure 
to properly instruct, it pointed out that the prior decision of 
this Court in the State v. Standiford, case, 769 P. 2d 263, 
specifically dealt with the issue raised by Appellant and stated 
that the trial court should instruct the jury clearly on the legal 
definition of "depraved indifference" instead of leaving that 
determination to the individual experience and knowledge of the 
jurors. 769 P.2d at 261. 
Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides 
that error may be assigned to the instructions even though no 
objection was made at the time of trial where the error would 
result in "manifest injustice." That term has been held by the 
3 
appellate courts to be essentially the same as the term "plain 
error." See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989)- Appellant 
submits that his argument under Point I of his brief on appeal 
raises the failure of the court to instruct to constitute manifest 
or plain error. Both of the requirements of the plain error 
doctrine are met. First, the error is plain in that this Court has 
specifically treated the need in a case such as the present one to 
define clearly the difference between the terms "depraved 
indifference" and "reckless." The instruction of the trial court 
failed to make any meaningful distinction or specific definition of 
the critical terms. Further, the instruction given by the trial 
court erroneously informed the jurors that the Appellant need not 
be aware that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause death. 
Where an appellate court has specifically provided guidance in an 
area, it would seem to logically follow that the trial courts 
should follow said guidance, especially where the failure to do so 
may result in a defendant being convicted of a greater offense than 
otherwise. 
As to the second prong of the plain error rule, Appellant 
submits that it is obvious that a different result may have 
occurred in his case had the jury been properly instructed. The 
danger of his being improperly convicted as a result of the 
improper instructions of the court is magnified by the fact that 
the court instructed the jury to consider first the question of his 
guilt under the second degree homicide instructions which included 
the "depraved indifference" definition, before they considered 
4 
lesser offenses, one of which was reckless manslaughter. 
Appellant submits that the "reasonably certain" language of 
the instruction concerning the term "knowingly," is a lesser 
standard than that required by Standiford of "a highly likely 
probability." See 7 69 P.2d at 264. This error further increases 
the likelihood that a properly instructed jury would reach a more 
favorable conclusion for the Appellant. 
Finally, although Appellant did not specifically use the term 
"plain error" in regard to his argument on the instructions under 
Point I of his brief on appeal, in Point II of Appellant's brief on 
appeal, the issue of plain error was raised in the argument 
concerning other of the instructions of the court. Appellant 
urges this Court to consider his arguments under Point I as the 
failure to properly instruct in such a critical area does 
constitute plain error or manifest injustice. 
POINT II 
THE COURT MAY REVIEW THE ISSUE OP WHETHER OR NOT THE 
APPELLANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SENTENCED AS A SECOND 
DEGREE FELONY AS A COURT HAS THE RIGHT TO CORRECT 
AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE AT ANY TIME 
Appellee has argued that the argument set forth in Appellant's 
brief on appeal, Point V, should not be considered by this Court 
since the issue was not raised at the trial court level. Appellant 
contends that the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 22(e), 
provides that a court can correct an illegal sentence at any time. 
Where, as argued in Points I, II, III, and IV of Appellant's brief, 
there are substantial questions raised concerning the jury's 
ability to differentiate between the crimes of criminal homicide 
5 
murder in the second degree and reckless manslaughter, if the 
conduct of the Appellant comes within either of the statutes, he is 
entitled to the lesser penalty. Where the trial court failed to 
properly instruct on the difference between the "depraved 
indifference" term of second degree murder and the "reckless" term 
of manslaughter, under the definition given by the court, the same 
conduct of the Appellant could come within either statute. In such 
a case, it is proper that the Defendant receive the lesser 
sentence. See State v. Brvan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Shondel. 22 Utah 2d 343, 435 P.2d 146 (1969). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that for the reasons set forth above, this 
Court should consider all issues raised in Appellant's brief on 
appeal and grant the relief requested therein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of March, 1993. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4) 
copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to Jan Graham, 
Utah Attorney General, and Marian Decker, Assistant Attorney 
General, at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114 this 4th 
day of March, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2(a)-3(2)(d) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 19(c) 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 22(e) 
7 
281 JUDICIAL CODE 78-2-2 
(Ji On January 1 1W2, the circuit courts in the 
Filth. Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Districts are estab-
lished as district courts in those municipalities where 
the circuit courts currently are located Circuit court 
ludcos of these judicial districts shall he district court 
judges as o( that date Judges of these districts shall 
stand for unopposed retention election as required by 
law 
('*) The authority ot the Judicial Council to replace 
a vacant circuit court judicial position with a court 
commissioner position within the limits established 
under Subsection (1) shall expire January 1,1996. 
1991 (2nd S & ) 
78-1-3. Effect of act on election functions. 
(1) Any justice or judge of a court of record, whose 
election to office was effective on or before July 1, 
1985, shall hold the office for the remainder of the 
term to which he was elected The justice or judge is 
subject to an unopposed retention election as provided 
by law at the general election immediately preceding 
the expiration of the respective term of office. 
(2) Any justice or judge of a court of record whose 
appointment to office was effective on or before July 
1, 1985, is subject to an unopposed retention election 
as provided by law at the first general election held 
more than three years after the date of the appoint-
ment 
(3) Any justice or judge of a court of record whose 
appointment to office was effective after July 1, 1985, 
is subject to an unopposed retention election as pro-
\ ided by law at the first general election held more 





78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief 
justice and associate chief justice — 
Selection and functions. 
7o-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court junsdiction. 
78-2-3 Repealed. 
78-2-4 Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. 
78-2-5. Repealed. 
78-2-6 Appellate court administrator. 
78-2-7. Repealed. 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
7^-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 
7H-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief jus-
tice and associate chief justice — Se-
lection and functions. 
• 1' The Supreme Court consists of five justices. 
'2» A justice of the Supreme Court shall be ap-
pointed initially to serve until the first general elec-
tion held more than three years after the effective 
date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office 
°f a justice of the Supreme Court is ten years and 
commences on the first Monday in January following 
the da it- of election. A justice whose term expires may 
H#rve upon request of the Judicial Council until a 
accessor is appointed and qualified. 
* • The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a 
chief justice from among the members of the court by 
d
 majority vote of all justices. The term of the office of 
1
 '^f justice is four years The chief justice may serve 
Recessive terms The chief justice may resign from 
••" office of chief justice without resigning from the 
Supreme Court The chief |ustice m.i\ he iemo\ed 
from the office of chief justice bv a majority vote of all 
justices of the Supreme Court 
(4) If the justices are unahle to elect a chief justice 
within 30 days of a vacancv in that office, the asso-
ciate chief justice shall act as chief justice until a 
chief justice is elected under this section If the asso-
ciate chief justice is unable or unwilling to act as 
chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief 
justice until a chief justice is elected under this sec-
tion. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a 
member of the Supreme Court, the chief justice has 
duties as provided by law. 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief jus-
tice. The term of office of the associate chief justice is 
two years. The associate chief justice may serve in 
that office no more than two successive terms. The 
associate chief justice shall be elected by a majority 
vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall 
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If 
the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to 
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief 
justice. The chief justice may delegate responsibilities 
to the associate chief justice as consistent with law. 
19<K1 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 1971. 1981 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its 
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdic-
tion. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the 
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the 
Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Com-
mission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudica-
tive proceedings originating with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and For-
estry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of 
agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of 
record holding a statute of the United States or 
this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah 
Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record involving a charge of a first degree or capi-
tal felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court 
of record over which the Court of Appeals does 
not have original appellate jurisdiction 
w» w u i m n N A L r K U l L I J L K K -
spt'Ltivi-juror <tnd an> party, witness or person 
alleged to base been victimized or injured by the 
defendant, which relationship when viewed ob-
jectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that 
the prospective juror would be unable or unwill-
ing to return a verdict which would be free of 
favoritism. A prospective jur -hall not be dis-
qualified solely because he is iebted to or em-
ployed by the state or a political subdivision 
thereof. 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to 
the defendant in a civil action, or having com-
plained against or having been accused by him in 
a criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which 
found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has 
tried another person for the particular offense 
charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to 
try the same charge, and whose verdict was set 
aside, or which was discharged without a verdict 
after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action 
brought against the defendant for the act 
charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with 
death, the entertaining of such conscientious 
opinions about the death penalty as would pre-
clude the juror from voting to impose the death 
penalty following conviction regardless of the 
facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year preced-
ing, has been engaged or interested in carrying 
on any business, calling or employment, the car-
rying on of which is a violation of law, where 
defendant is charged with a like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either for 
or against the defendant on the preliminary ex-
amination or before the grand jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an unquali-
fied opinion or belief as to whether the defendant 
is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of 
the juror with reference to the cause, or to either 
party, which will prevent him from acting impar-
tially and without prejudice to the substantial 
rights of the party challenging; but no person 
shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of hav-
ing formed or expressed an opinion upon the mat-
ter or cause to be submitted to such jury, founded 
upon public rumor, statements in public journals 
or common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears 
to the court that the juror can and will, notwith-
standing such opinion, act impartially and fairly 
upon the matter to be submitted to him. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by 
the prosecution and then by the defense alternately. 
Challenges for cause shall be completed before pe-
remptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be 
impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which 
they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or be-
come, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. 
The prosecution and defense shall each have one ad-
ditional peremptory challenge for each alternate ju-
ror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, 
take the same oath and enjoy the same privileges as 
regular jurors. 
ih) A statutory exemption from service.i-
a privilege of the person exempted and , 
ground for challenge for cause 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath .-h J 
ministered to the jurors, in substance, that in 
each of them will well and truly try the m.r-
issue between the parties, and render a tru< 
according to the evidence and the instruction 
court. 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such . 
time as the court reasonably directs, any pam • 
file written request that the court instruct the mr 
the law as set forth in the request. At the sanu 
copies of such requests shall be furnished to th»-..» 
parties. The court shall inform counsel of us pp,;.. 
action upon the request; and it shall furnish u.'.r .. 
with a copy of its proposed instructions, unk-
parties stipulate that such instructions may be «j.\. • 
orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented ,r.. 
given, or refused, the court shall endorse its deei-;. • 
and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and par-
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by th. 
endorsement what part of the charge was given and 
what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion <•! tK 
charge or omission therefrom unless he object-
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinct i, 
the matter to which he objects and the ground of h:-
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to objeu 
error may be assigned to instructions in order to 
avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence 1 n 
the case, and if the court refers to any of the evidence-, 
it shall instruct the jury that they are the exclusive 
judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be 
made after the court has instructed the jury. Unle.>-
otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon time 
for argument shall be within the discretion of the 
court. 
Rule 20. Exceptions unnecessary. 
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are un 
necessary. It is sufficient that a party state his objec 
tions to the actions of the court and the reasons there-
for. If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling 
or order, the absence of an objection shall not thereaf-
ter prejudice him. 
Rule 21. Verdict 
(a) The verdict of the jury shall be either "guilty' 
or "not guilty," "not guilty by reason of insanity," 
"guilty and mentally ill," or "not guilty of the crime 
charged but guilty of a lesser included offense," or 
"not guilty of the crime charged but guilty of a lesser 
included offense and mentally ill" provided that when 
the defense of mental illness has been asserted and 
the defendant is acquitted on the ground that he was 
insane at the time of the commission of the offense 
charged, the verdict shall be "not guilty by reason of 
insanity." 
(b) The verdict shall be unanimous. It shall be re-
turned by the jury to the judge in open court and in 
the presence of the defendant and counsel. If the de-
fendant voluntarily absents himself, the verdict may 
be received in his absence. 
(c) If there are two or more defendants, the jury at 
any time during its deliberations may return a ver-
dict or verdicts with respect to any defendant as to 
whom it has agreed If the jury cannot agree with 
Rule 22 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(8> If the defendant is placed on parole, treatment 
shall, upon the recommendation of the Psychiatric 
Security Review Board, be made a condition of parole. 
Failure to continue treatment or other condition of 
parole except by agreement with the designated men-
tal health services provider and the Board of Pardons 
is a basis for initiating parole violation hearings. The 
period of parole may not be for fewer than five years 
or until the expiration of the defendant's sentence, 
whichever comes first, and may not be reduced with-
out consideration by the Board of Pardons of a cur-
rent report on the mental health status of the of-
fender. 
(9) (a) A defendant who pleads or is found guilty 
and mentally ill who is placed on probation by 
the sentencing court, shall be placed under the 
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board. The Psychiatric Security Review Board 
shall make treatment a condition of probation if 
the defendant is shown to be treatable and facili-
ties exist for treatment of the offender in a proba-
tion status. Reports as specified by the trial judge 
shall be filed with the probation officer and the 
sentencing court. 
(b) Failure to continue treatment or other con-
dition of probation, except by agreement with the 
treating agency and the Psychiatric Security Re-
view Board, is a basis for the initiation of proba-
tion violation hearings. The period of probation 
may not be for fewer than five years or until the 
expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever 
comes first, and may not be reduced by the sen-
tencing court without consideration of a current 
report on the mental health status of the of-
fender. 
(c) Treatment or other care may be provided 
by or under contract with the Division of Mental 
Health, a local mental health authority, or, with 
the approval of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board, any other mental health provider. A re-
port shall be filed with the probation officer and 
the sentencing court every three months during 
the period of probation. If a motion on a petition 
to discontinue probation is made by the defen-
dant, the probation officer shall request a report. 
A motion on a petition to discontinue probation 
may not be heard more than once every six 
months. 
(10> "(a) With regard to persons committed by the 
court to the Utah State Hospital or other facility 
under this section prior to July 1, 1989, the effec-
tive date of this act, the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital, or his designee, shall peti-
tion the court within 60 days after that date for 
review of those orders. The court shall review 
and modify those orders to include commitment 
to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Re-
view Board established under Section 77-38-2. 
(b) With regard to persons who have been 
placed on probation by the sentencing court un-
der Subsection (9) prior to July 1, 1989, the effec-
tive date of this act. the executive director of the 
Department of Corrections, or his designee, shall 
petition the court within 60 days after that date 
for review of those orders. The court shall review 
and modify those orders to include placement un-
der the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board established under Section 77-38-2. 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or 
plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for impos-
ing sentence which shall be not less than two 
more than 30 days after the verdict or plea uni? * 
the court, with the concurrence of the defendant . >* 
erwise orders. Pending sentence, the court mav
 c<»-
mit the defendant or may continue or alter bail 
recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford • 
defendant an opportunity to make a statement m » 
own behalf and to present any information in miiiu 
tion of punishment, or to show any legal cause wh 
sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting ,,'•' 
torney shall also be given an opportunity to pres»r 
any information material to the imposition of s*-n 
tence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant ma> u 
tried in his absence, he may likewise be sentenced m 
his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for str, 
tence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by th»-
court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of m, 
contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall en-
ter a judgment of conviction which shall include the 
plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Follow-
ing imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the 
defendant of his right to appeal and the time within 
which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, i he 
court shall issue its commitment setting forth the 
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the 
jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commit-
ment to the jail or prison and shall make his return 
on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time 
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment. 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the 
court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a 
defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the 
defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause 
for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment 
the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the 
offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, 
order a commitment until the defendant is charged 
anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may 
be just and proper under the circumstances. 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon 
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had 
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a 
party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writ-
ing and upon notice. The motion shall be accompa-
nied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to 
procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone 
the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems 
reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 
10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such 
further time as the court may fix during the ten-day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in 
the same position as if no trial had been held and the 
former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either 
in evidence or in argument. 
Rule 25. Dismissal without trial. 
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in 
furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its 
